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Abstract:  9 
The theory of evolution links random variation and selection to incremental adaptation. In a 10 
different intellectual domain, learning theory links incremental adaptation (e.g., from positive 11 
and/or negative reinforcement) to intelligent behaviour. Specifically, learning theory explains 12 
how incremental adaptation can acquire knowledge from past experience and use it to direct 13 
future behaviours toward favourable outcomes. Until recently such cognitive learning seemed 14 
irrelevant to the ‘uninformed’ process of evolution. In our opinion, however, new results 15 
formally linking evolutionary processes to the principles of learning might provide solutions 16 
to several evolutionary puzzles – the evolution of evolvability, the evolution of ecological 17 
organisation, and evolutionary transitions in individuality. If so, the ability for evolution to 18 
learn might explain how it produces such apparently intelligent designs.  19 
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Learning and evolution 20 
New insights and new ways of understanding are often provided by analogies. Analogous 21 
reasoning is regarded as a core faculty of human cognition [1], and necessary for complex 22 
abstract causal reasoning [2]. In biology, analogy is sometimes considered to be the poor cousin 23 
of homology – similar, but not really the same. But in science more generally, analogies can 24 
be founded on perfect equivalences, e.g. mathematical isomorphisms or algorithmic 25 
equivalence, thus enabling the transfer of ready-made results from one system or discipline to 26 
another, e.g. between quasispecies theory and population genetics [3,4], electromagnetic fields 27 
and hydrodynamics [5], and magnetism and neural networks [6].  The previously casual 28 
analogy between learning systems and evolution by natural selection has recently been 29 
deepened to a level where such transfer can begin. 30 
How intelligent is evolution? 31 
Evolution is sometimes likened to an active problem solver, seeking-out ingenious solutions to 32 
difficult environmental challenges. The solutions discovered by evolution can certainly appear 33 
ingenious. Mechanistically, however, there appear to be good reasons to doubt that cognitive 34 
problem solving and evolution are equivalent in any real sense. For example, cognitive problem 35 
solving can utilise past knowledge about a problem domain to ‘anticipate’ future outcomes and 36 
direct exploration of solutions, whereas evolutionary exploration is myopic and dependent on 37 
undirected variation. Intelligent problem solvers can also form high-level or modular 38 
representations of a problem, making it easier to re-use partial solutions in new contexts, 39 
whereas evolution merely plods on, filtering random replication errors.  40 
Yet, this is not the whole story. Whilst genetic variation might be undirected, the pattern of 41 
phenotypic variation is shaped and biased by the processes of development. Moreover, the 42 
organisation of developmental processes (from gene-regulatory interactions to morphological 43 
body-plans) is itself, in large part, a product of past evolution. This affords the possibility that 44 
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random genetic changes might produce phenotypic changes that are ‘informed’ by past 45 
selection [7-9]. This can direct phenotypic variation into different or higher-level 46 
morphological dimensions and/or modularise phenotypic features and re-deploy them in new 47 
contexts [10,8,11]. The question thus arises; is evolution by natural selection (e.g., by adapting 48 
the organisation of developmental processes) able to facilitate subsequent adaptation in the 49 
same way that a learning system can exploit knowledge from past experience? If so, evolution 50 
might be a ‘smarter’ problem solver than generally appreciated [12] and learning theory could 51 
explain how.  52 
Of course, at the time when Darwin sought a mechanistic explanation for evolutionary 53 
adaptation, the theory of algorithms (see Glossary) didn’t exist as we know it now and an 54 
analogy with learning would not have been illuminating. A century later, when Turing provided 55 
the first formal framework of computation, it was immediately used to propose an algorithmic 56 
account of learning and intelligence [13]. The well-developed understanding of learning 57 
algorithms that we have now, vastly expands the space of mechanistic possibilities that might 58 
be used to answer Darwin’s question.  59 
This opinion paper discusses how: a) Recent work shows that the link between learning and 60 
evolution is a mathematical equivalence, b) Accordingly, knowledge from the theory of 61 
learning can be converted and redeployed in evolutionary theory, c) This offers exciting 62 
opportunities to address fundamental evolutionary puzzles in new ways.  63 
 64 
Unifying learning and evolution   65 
A system exhibits learning if its performance at some task improves with experience [14]. 66 
Reusing behaviours that have been successful in the past (reinforcement learning) is intuitively 67 
similar to the way selection increases the proportion of fit phenotypes in a population [15-18].   68 
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In fact, evolutionary processes and simple learning processes are formally equivalent. In 69 
particular, learning can be implemented by incrementally adjusting a probability distribution 70 
over behaviours (e.g. Bayesian updating) or, if a behaviour is represented by a vector of 71 
features or components, by adjusting the probability of using each individual component in 72 
proportion to its average reward in past behaviours (e.g. Multiplicative Weights Update 73 
Algorithm, MWUA [19]). Harper [20] and Shalizi [21] showed that the former is 74 
mathematically equivalent to soft selection on genotypes in asexual populations, and Chastain 75 
et al. [19] have very recently shown that the latter is equivalent to selection acting on individual 76 
alleles at linkage equilibrium in sexual populations [22,23]. Evolution thus acquires 77 
information from past selection in the same principled way that simple learning systems acquire 78 
information from past experience (see also [24,25]). These results can be seen within the 79 
integrative framework provided by Valiant, who shows how formal limits on what can be 80 
learned can be transferred to characterise formal limits on what can be evolved [26,27]. 81 
Can evolutionary systems ‘anticipate’ future outcomes?  82 
A key feature of learning systems that seems disanalogous to evolutionary systems is their 83 
ability to anticipate actions that will confer future benefits. But learning systems, just like 84 
evolutionary systems, are not really able to ‘see the future’ – they cannot learn from benefits 85 
that have not yet occurred. Learning systems are, however, able to extrapolate or generalise 86 
from past experience. To move beyond repeating behaviours by rote, generalisation requires 87 
an appropriate model – an indirect, usually compact, way of representing behaviours. Learning 88 
proceeds simply by incrementally improving the fit of a model to past experience, and new 89 
behaviours can then be generated from this model.  90 
The clever part of learning methods concerns how behaviours are parameterised in this 91 
model space. In a good model space, desirable future behaviours should be similar (nearby) to 92 
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behaviours that were useful in the past. For example, perhaps ‘eating apples’ should be close 93 
to ‘eating pears’ but far from ‘eating red things’. 94 
In the asexual and sexual populations mentioned above, the implicit model space is simply 95 
a point in genotype frequency space or allele frequency space, respectively. The latter is a 96 
compact way of representing a distribution over genotypes at linkage equilibrium (a univariate 97 
model, Box 1). This allows a limited sense of generalisation in that new combinations of alleles 98 
can be generated from this distribution (i.e. by recombination). In fact, sexual reproduction 99 
constitutes a surprisingly efficient trade-off between exploiting alleles that were fit on average 100 
in past examples and sampling alleles in new combinations [19]. This simple kind of 101 
generalisation is ideal when alleles are actually independent (absent of epistasis) whereas 102 
asexual reproduction is logical if genotypes cannot be decomposed into independently fit 103 
components. Although assuming features are independent is often a pragmatic first 104 
approximation, and conversely, assuming complete interdependence covers all eventualities, 105 
in most learning tasks neither of these naive extremes is ideal. 106 
 107 
[Box 1] 108 
 109 
For example, in a modular problem, where features in different modules are approximately 110 
independent but features in the same module are not, then effective generalisation would be 111 
provided by new combinations of modules. Genetically, free recombination would disrupt 112 
modules and asexual reproduction would fail to exploit the independence of one module from 113 
another. An appropriate compromise is provided by an intermediate level of recombination, 114 
such as when nucleotides within genes do not recombine, but genes do. Given intragenic 115 
epistasis but not intergenic epistasis, the generalisation this provides explains a significant 116 
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advantage for sex [28]. However, this relies on an a priori correspondence between the physical 117 
linkage of components and their epistatic dependencies [28].   118 
Can evolution learn like neural networks learn? 119 
More advanced learning requires more flexible model types (Box 1) that alleviate a dependence 120 
on the original feature space; enabling items that appear to be different (far apart in feature 121 
space) to be represented as nearby points in model space. A minimal example is a correlation 122 
model – a simple way of representing interactions between features. The representation of 123 
associations or correlations has the same fundamental relationship to learning as transistors 124 
have to electronics or logic gates to computation (and synapses to neural networks). Although 125 
mechanisms to learn a single correlation between two features can be trivial, these are also 126 
sufficient, when built-up in appropriate networks, to learn arbitrarily complex functions [31]. 127 
This type of learning can be implemented by incrementally adjusting the parameters of a 128 
correlation model in the direction that reduces error (supervised learning) or maximises reward 129 
(reinforcement learning) (Box 2.i). For example, this is the basis of neural network learning 130 
models (operating by adjusting synaptic connection strengths, hence connectionist learning) 131 
which have been extraordinarily successful in numerous learning applications [29-31].   132 
Again, mathematical equivalences with evolution have recently been shown [26,32]. 133 
For evolution, learning of this type requires separating phenotypes from genotypes and 134 
evolving the parameters of a mapping between them. When there is heritable variation in this 135 
mapping that affects phenotypic correlations, natural selection inevitably favours changes that 136 
adhere to correlation learning principles [26,32]. A minimal example is the evolution of a single 137 
‘relational’ allele, causing subsequent mutations to produce correlated variation in two 138 
phenotypic traits [33] (e.g. via pleiotropy). Pavlicev et al. showed that selection on relational 139 
alleles increases phenotypic correlation if the traits are selected together and decreases it if they 140 
are selected antagonistically (Hebbian learning) [33,32].  This simple step from evolving traits 141 
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to evolving correlations between traits is crucial; it moves the object of natural selection from 142 
fit phenotypes (which ultimately removes phenotypic variability altogether), to the control of 143 
phenotypic variability. 144 
 145 
[Box 2] 146 
In larger biological networks, this principle has the same effect as it does in larger neural 147 
networks (hence evolutionary connectionism [37]). In the Hopfield network [6], for example, 148 
this type of learning is sufficient for simple cognitive behaviours such as forming an associative 149 
memory capable of storing and recalling multiple distinct activation patterns, and effective 150 
generalisation in numerous recognition and classification tasks [32,78]. Watson et al. 151 
demonstrated conditions where evolved gene-regulation networks produce exactly the same 152 
behaviours [32]; forming a distributed ‘developmental memory’ of multiple phenotypes 153 
selected in the past, and generalising by producing new combinations of phenotypic modules 154 
(Fig. 1). 155 
 156 
 [Figure 1] 157 
 158 
These results, and others [37,26,40,41], demonstrate that evolution and learning are not 159 
merely analogous processes but (different instantiations of) the same algorithmic principles. 160 
Transfer of specific models and results between these intellectual domains is already proving 161 
productive. Whilst it is important to apply analogies critically, learning theory is not just one 162 
thing – the issue is not so much to determine where the analogy breaks down, but to find the 163 
right kind of learning theory for each of the biological phenomena that are in need of 164 
explanation. Below we discuss three examples where learning theory makes sense of biological 165 
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ideas that are currently confusing, suggesting predictions that arise by transferring well-known 166 
learning results.  167 
Future Prospects: Understanding how evolution transforms itself  168 
Learning theory offers new concepts and theoretical tools for tackling several important 169 
puzzles in contemporary evolutionary biology. We identify specific learning models that 170 
inspire new approaches to key open questions in evolutionary developmental biology (evo-171 
devo), evolutionary ecology (evo-eco) and evolutionary transitions in individuality (or “evo-172 
ego” [37]) (Outstanding Questions, Box 3).  Each of these areas is challenging for 173 
evolutionary theory because they involve feedbacks where the products of evolution modify 174 
the mechanisms of the evolutionary process that created them (Fig. 2) [33,45-49]. Although it 175 
is clear that the processes of variation, selection and reproduction underpinning evolutionary 176 
adaptation are not constants in natural populations, theoretical treatments of ‘modifier alleles’ 177 
that enable selection to act on these processes are currently very limited. There is growing 178 
recognition that an integrated framework that puts such feedbacks front-and-centre is 179 
desireable [42-44]. Learning theory is precisely the study of processes that change over time 180 
as a function of past experience [14,31,34]. It is thus ideally suited to describing, not just how 181 
variation, selection and inheritance adapt phenotypes, but how natural selection modifies 182 
variation, selection and inheritance over time. We note that feedbacks on these three processes 183 
result in correlations or co-variance between components that were previously independent [37] 184 
(Fig. 2). Learning theory has well-understood models for each case.  185 
a) Evo-devo: the evolution of evolvability and correlation learning 186 
The evolution of developmental biases and constraints, accumulated over past selection, might 187 
improve the distribution of phenotypes explored in the future [52,45,54,7]. But the core issue 188 
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in the evolution of evolvability [7,51,52,45] is that selection cannot favour traits for benefits 189 
that have not yet been realised [9,53].  190 
Learning theory offers a solution. First, a memory of phenotypes that have been selected in 191 
the past (e.g. Fig 1) can facilitate faster adaptation whenever these phenotypes are selected 192 
again in the future [33,8]. Second, and more importantly, because learned models can 193 
generalise (e.g. Fig. 1.J), an evolved memory can, as illustrated by Parter et al. [8], also 194 
facilitate faster adaptation to new targets. In short, evolvability is to evolution as generalisation 195 
is to learning. 196 
Whilst generalisation is not always easy, it does not require clairvoyance – it simply requires 197 
the ability to find structural regularities that are deep enough to be invariant over time [26]. 198 
Accordingly, the possibility that evolution can learn from experience to favourably bias future 199 
exploration need not be any more mysterious than the basic result that learning from a training 200 
set can produce good generalisation on an unseen test set [55]. This also sheds light on the 201 
tension between robustness and evolvability. Here the problem is that adapting variation 202 
mechanisms so that they are less likely to produce deleterious variants (e.g. via canalisation) 203 
is often more immediately advantageous than adapting them so that they are more likely to 204 
produce adaptive variants [9,56]. Learning theory understands this tension extremely well. 205 
Specifically, over-fitting occurs when learning improves performance on training data but 206 
worsens performance on test data. To avoid this, the complexity of a model can be limited (e.g. 207 
by applying a parsimony pressure) to prevent memorisation of unnecessary details and force 208 
solutions to capture deeper regularities (Box 1). This explains why a cost of connections 209 
increases evolved modularity and improves evolvability [55,57].  210 
Using past experience to favourably direct future behaviour is a hallmark of intelligence. 211 
By showing that incremental adjustment in the parameters of an appropriate model is sufficient 212 
to achieve this, learning theory puts this behaviour within reach of evolution by natural 213 
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selection, and identifies conditions where it can learn to favourably direct future exploration 214 
(Box 3, prediction 1). 215 
b) Evo-eco: ecological organisation and unsupervised correlation learning  216 
Organisms can modify their biotic and abiotic environment and thereby alter the selective 217 
pressures that act on themselves [43,46,48,58-61]. By modifying the network of ecological 218 
dependencies with other species, this might result in ecological organisations that increase the 219 
self-regulation of ecosystem variables, the resilience of ecological networks, or the efficiency 220 
of resource utilisation [62-64]. But since ecosystems are not, in most cases, evolutionary units 221 
[49,50], such feedbacks could also result in effects that are destructive in the long term, e.g. 222 
making an ecosystem more brittle or susceptible to catastrophic regime change, decreasing 223 
total biomass, etc. At present, however, we have no general organising principles for 224 
understanding how the structural organisation of ecological networks changes over 225 
evolutionary time, nor how this affects ecological functions and dynamics [58,49,64-67].  226 
A different type of learning is relevant here. Unsupervised learning mechanisms do not 227 
depend on an external reward signal. By reinforcing correlations that are frequent, regardless 228 
of whether they are good, unsupervised correlation learning can produce system-level 229 
behaviours without system-level rewards (Box 2.ii). This can be implemented without 230 
centralised learning mechanisms as in connectionist models of intelligence [31,6,37] or 231 
distributed multi-agent systems [35] (simple forms of collective intelligence [35,68-70]). 232 
Recent theoretical work shows that selection acting only to maximise individual growth rate, 233 
when applied to inter-specific competition coefficients within an ecological community, 234 
produces unsupervised learning at the system level [38] (Box 2.iii). This is an exciting 235 
possibility because it means that, despite not being a unit of selection, an ecological community 236 
might exhibit organisations that confer coordinated collective behaviours, e.g. a distributed 237 
ecological memory that can recall multiple past ecological states [38].  238 
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Learning theory shows that incremental adjustment in the parameters of individual 239 
behaviours is sufficient to achieve such collective behaviours [35], putting them within reach 240 
of individual-level selection. Accordingly, learning theory describes conditions where 241 
individual-level natural selection might facilitate ecological organisation and collective 242 
behaviour (Box 3, prediction 2).  243 
c) Evo-ego: The evolution of individuality and deep correlation learning 244 
In the major evolutionary transitions [47,71-73] “entities that were capable of independent 245 
replication before the transition can replicate only as part of a larger whole after the 246 
transition”[74,73]. These transitions in individuality [75,47,71] involve the evolution of new 247 
mechanisms of inheritance or reproductive codispersal (e.g., vertical genetic transmission, 248 
compartmentalisation, reproductive linkage) [76,74,73,77] that create new evolutionary units. 249 
But there’s a catch: If individual and group interests are aligned then selection applied at the 250 
group level doesn't alter evolutionary outcomes, and if individual and group interests are not 251 
aligned then individual-level selection will oppose the creation and maintenance of adaptations 252 
that enforce selection at the group level [47]. Given this, how can evolution at one level of 253 
biological organisation systematically create reproductive organisations that facilitate non-254 
trivial adaptation at a higher level of organisation before that level of adaptation exists?  255 
In neural networks, deep learning [29] exploits correlation learning at multiple-scales to 256 
build multivariate models (Box 1). Deep belief nets [29], an exciting recent development 257 
igniting renewed interest in neural networks, achieve this in a bottom-up fashion, ‘freezing’ 258 
each layer before adding the next. This creates the need to infer low-level representations that 259 
are useful for learning higher-order representations before the higher level of representation 260 
exists. Unsupervised learning provides a solution. By reducing the effective dimensionality of 261 
the data it ‘primes’ good performance at the next layer even though it is not informed by what 262 
the data will be used for at the next level [78]. In evolutionary systems, selection at one level 263 
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of organisation can operate like unsupervised learning at a higher level of organisation (Box 264 
2.iii)[38]. Abstract models incorporating these features show that individual-level selection can 265 
thus prime the systematic formation of adaptive higher-level evolutionary units without pre-266 
supposing selection at the higher level [79,80]. New optimisation methods based on these 267 
principles demonstrate problem-solving capabilities that cannot be achieved with single-level 268 
adaptation [79,36]. We think this suggests that such deep optimisation principles might explain 269 
how evolutionary transitions facilitate deep evolutioni, i.e. the evolution of adaptive biological 270 
complexity through successive levels of biological organisation [37,47,71-73] (Box 3, 271 
prediction 3).  272 
Efficiently reducing a problem by re-scaling a search process at a higher level of 273 
representation is another hallmark of intelligent problem solving. Again learning theory places 274 
this within reach of evolution by showing how incremental adaptation, in the right model, can 275 
achieve this. 276 
Taken together, correlation learning, unsupervised correlation learning and deep correlation 277 
learning thus provide a formal way to understand how variation, selection and inheritance, 278 
respectively, might be transformed over evolutionary time (Fig. 2). We do not claim that 279 
evolvability, ecosystem organisation or the level of evolutionary unit will always increase – on 280 
the contrary, we argue that learning theory can be used to characterise the conditions when it 281 
will and when it won’t.  282 
Conclusions   283 
Learning and evolution share common underlying principles both conceptually and formally 284 
[16,18-22,26,32,37,38,41]. This provides access to well-developed theoretical tools that have 285 
not been fully exploited in evolutionary theory (and conversely, suggests opportunities for 286 
                                                          
i Thanks to Seth Bullock for suggesting the term “deep evolution”. 
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evolutionary theory to expand cognitive science [81,82]). Learning theory is not just a different 287 
way of describing what we already knew about evolution. It expands what we think evolution 288 
is capable of. In particular, it shows that via the incremental evolution of developmental, 289 
ecological or reproductive organisations natural selection is sufficient to produce significant 290 
features of intelligent problem-solving.  291 
In current evolutionary theory, it seems impossible that natural selection can anticipate 292 
what is needed in novel selective environments, that ecological organisation can occur without 293 
community-level selection or that new levels of individuality could emerge systematically from 294 
selection on lower-level units. We argue that specific types of learning provide concrete models 295 
for such phenomena and suggest predictions that might be tested. We think this offers the 296 
potential to better explain how the process of random variation and selection results in the 297 
apparently intelligent designs it produces. 298 
 299 
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Glossary: 306 
Algorithm: A self-contained step-by-step set of instructions describing a process, mechanism or function. An 307 
algorithmic description of a mechanism is sufficiently abstract to be ‘multiply realisable’ – i.e., it may be 308 
instantiated or implemented in different physical substrates (e.g. biological, computational, mechanical) 309 
whilst producing the same results. For example, Darwin’s account of evolutionary adaptation (via repeated 310 
applications of variation, selection and inheritance) is fundamentally algorithmic and hence encompasses 311 
many possible instantiations (e.g. including the molecular details unknown at the time). 312 
Associative learning/memory: Learning correlations between inputs and outputs, or learning what features co-313 
occur in the input [6,42,78,26]. Associative memory is an ability to recall a pattern from a stimulus e.g. 314 
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“Darwin”→ “Evolution”, “Hebb”→“Learning” (hetero-associative memory), or to recall a complete pattern 315 
from a noisy or partial stimulus, e.g. “Cha-les –ar-in” →“ Charles Darwin”, “-ona-d H-b-” →“Donald Hebb”  316 
(auto-associative memory) [6]. Analogue of e.g. evolving the mapping between genotype and phenotype, or 317 
the correlations among phenotypic features governed by developmental interactions [33,39,32]. 318 
Bayesian learning (Bayesian updating): A learning method using Bayes rule as a principled way to incorporate 319 
new information with past experience. Analogue of selection in asexual population (replicator equation) 320 
[20,31]. 321 
Bivariate model: A model that captures pairwise interactions between features (aka correlation model restricted 322 
to pairwise correlations). 323 
Correlation learning: see associative learning 324 
Deep learning: Learning high-level representations by learning correlations on top of correlations, etc. Levels can 325 
be learned simultaneously [31], or one at a time (deep belief networks) [29]. 326 
Evo-devo: Evolutionary developmental biology [7,42]. Here we are particularly interested in the evolution of 327 
developmental organisations that change the co-variance of phenotypic traits (analogue of correlation 328 
learning) [32]. 329 
Evo-eco: Evolutionary ecology [67,58,46,59,49]. Here we are particularly interested in the evolution of ecological 330 
relationships that change the co-selection of species (analogue of unsupervised correlation learning) [38]. 331 
Evo-ego: The evolution of Darwinian individuality [83,74,71,72]. We propose the term “evo-ego” [37] to refer to 332 
the evolution of organisations (reproductive structures) that change the evolutionary unit – i.e. the level of 333 
biological organisation that exhibits heritable variation in reproductive success [47]. Here we are particularly 334 
interested in the evolution of reproductive relationships that change the co-inheritance of fitness 335 
differences [77]. This includes new modes of reproduction modifying the heritability of collectives [47,80] 336 
(e.g. vertical transmission of symbionts, as in the origin of eukaryote organelles [83,84]), the origin of 337 
chromosomes (via physical linkage of previously independently-replicating genetic material [85]), changing 338 
reproduction from migrant pool reproduction to group-fissioning [72], or encapsulation in compartments 339 
(e.g. cell membranes, as in evolutionary transition from replicators on a surface to replicators in 340 
compartments) [84,73]. 341 
Evolutionary connectionism: A developing theory for the evolution of biological organisation based on the 342 
hypothesis that the positive feedback between network topology and behaviour, well-understood in neural 343 
network models (e.g. Hebbian learning), is common to the evolution of developmental, ecological and 344 
reproductive organisations [37,70,35,36,32]. 345 
Hebbian learning: Learning that occurs by altering the strength of synaptic connections between neurons 346 
[14,6,31]. For example, ‘neurons that fire together wire together’ is a Hebbian learning principle that 347 
strengthens the connection between two neurons when they are activated at the same time or by the same 348 
stimulus. Pavlicev et al. [33] showed that the action of natural selection adheres to Hebbian principles when 349 
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acting on heritable variation that affects correlations (e.g. gene-regulatory connections [32]). Power et al. 350 
[38] show Hebbian learning in the evolution of ecological interactions. 351 
Hopfield network: A simple type of neural-network model where each neuron is (potentially) connected to every 352 
other neuron bi-directionally [6,30]. The Hopfield network has been used as a mathematical model for (non-353 
neural) dynamical systems and emergent collective behaviours in many different domains including gene-354 
regulation networks and ecological networks.  355 
Inductive bias: Because, in principle, there are many general concepts that are consistent with a given set of 356 
examples, learning from examples always involves inductive bias (i.e. that a priori favours a given class of 357 
generalisations). However, there are quite generic inductive biases that, although fallible in principle, prove 358 
extremely effective in practise. Occam’s razor is one such bias – favouring simple models over more complex 359 
models that explain the same data [14]. See also parsimony pressure. 360 
Major evolutionary transitions: Evolutionary innovations that have changed the evolutionary unit (the level of 361 
biological organisation that exhibits heritable variation in reproductive success): from self-replicating 362 
molecules, to chromosomes, to simple cells, to multi-organelle eukaryote cells, to multicellular organisms, to 363 
social groups [74,73] (see evo-ego). 364 
Multivariate model: A model that captures high-order correlations (greater than pairwise interactions) among 365 
features [31]. 366 
Over-fitting: The tendency of a learning algorithm to perform well on the training set but poorly on the test set 367 
due to fitting idiosyncrasies of the training set. Failure to generalise correctly [14]. Analogous to securing 368 
fitness benefits in current selective environment (robustness) at the expense of potential fitness benefits in 369 
future environments (evolvability). 370 
Parsimony pressure: A technique used in learning that penalises model complexity to favour simple models over 371 
complex ones. Simple models often produce superior generalisation by alleviating over-fitting [14]. 372 
Reinforcement learning: Trial and error learning based on an evaluative or reward signal, providing the learner 373 
with a measure of the value or quality of a given solution or behaviour, used to amplify successful and 374 
reduce unsuccessful behaviours [14]. Analogue of selection. 375 
Supervised learning: Learning that changes parameters of a behaviour in the direction that reduces the error (i.e. 376 
error = desired output-actual output). Sometimes implies an external teacher that knows the desired output 377 
– but in practice, it usually means simply modifying parameters by gradient descent on an error function 378 
(rather than by trail and error) [14]. The combination of random variation and selection can effect the same 379 
changes in a model given the same gradient; thus an analogue of selection for a particular target phenotype 380 
or phenotypes [32] (see also selection in varying environments or for a set of target phenotypes [8,51]).  381 
Test set: Data used to test the accuracy of a model once built (future performance). To test generalisation, the 382 
test set includes points that were not presented during training [14]. Analogue of future/novel selective 383 
environments.  384 
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Training set: Data used to build a model (past experience) [14]. Analogue of past selective environments. 385 
Trial and error learning: Learning by trialling behaviours at random until a solution is discovered. If each new 386 
behaviour that is sampled is a small random modification of the previous behaviour, this becomes a form of 387 
incremental adaptation.  388 
Under-fitting: The condition that a learned model has failed to accurately fit the training set. Contrast, over-389 
fitting [14]. 390 
Univariate model: A model that treats each parameter as independent (unable to represent correlations). 391 
Unsupervised learning: Learning that aims to optimise a task-independent criterion function based on current 392 
output only (e.g. stability or robustness of the output). Occurs without knowledge of a desired output 393 
function/external teacher, e.g. by reinforcing the current output regardless of its quality. In particular, 394 
unsupervised correlation learning, where correlations that are already frequent in the training data are 395 
reinforced (rather than correlations that are good w.r.t. a task, as in reinforcement/supervised correlation 396 
learning). The aim of unsupervised learning is to discover categories, clusters or regularities inherent in the 397 
training samples and hence reduce the effective dimensionality of the data [14] (see Box 2). 398 
 399 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 563 
 564 
Fig. 1: A recurrent gene-regulation network (GRN) evolved in a varying environment exhibits associative 565 
learning behaviours. See [32] for details. When a Hopfield network is trained on a set of patterns with Hebbian 566 
learning it forms an associative memory of the patterns in the training set. When subsequently stimulated with 567 
random excitation patterns, the activation dynamics of the trained network will spontaneously recall the 568 
patterns from the training set or generate new patterns that are generalisations of the training patterns [39,6,30]. 569 
Here the evolution of connections in a GRN is shown to follow such Hebbian learning principles. The evolved 570 
GRN thus forms an associative memory of phenotypes that have been selected for in the past, spontaneously 571 
recreating these phenotypes as attractors of development with the GRN and also producing new phenotypes 572 
that are generalisations of them. A-D) A GRN is evolved to produce first one phenotype and then another in an 573 
alternating fashion [51,8]: A=Charles Darwin, B=Donald Hebb (who first described Hebbian Learning). The 574 
resulting phenotype is not merely an average of the two phenotypic patterns that were selected in the past (as 575 
per a univariate model or free recombination of phenotype pixels). Rather, different embryonic phenotypes (e.g. 576 
random initial conditions C and D) develop into different adult phenotypes with this evolved GRN match either 577 
A or B (one initial phenotype that falls into each developmental attractor is shown). These two phenotypes can 578 
be produced from genotypes that are a single mutation apart [32]. E-J) In a separate experiment, selection 579 
iterates over a set of target phenotypes (E-H). In addition to developing phenotypes that match patterns selected 580 
in the past (e.g. I), this GRN also generalises to produce new phenotypes that were not selected for in the past 581 
but belong to a structurally similar class e.g., by creating novel combinations of evolved modules (e.g. 582 
developmental attractors exist for a phenotype with all 4 ‘loops’ [32], J) – see also [8]. This demonstrates a 583 
capability for evolution to exhibit phenotypic novelty in exactly the same sense that learning neural networks 584 
can generalise from past experience [32]. 585 
  586 
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KEY FIGURE. Fig. 2: Challenges in current evolutionary theory – caused when the products of evolution modify 587 
the mechanisms of evolution. Key components of evolution by natural selection – variation, selection and 588 
inheritance [50] – are defined by structures (boxed) that are themselves modified by products of the 589 
evolutionary  process (dotted arrows). Evo-devo: the evolution of developmental interactions modifies the 590 
distribution of phenotypic variation, Evo-eco: the evolution of ecological interactions modifies the structure of 591 
selective pressures, Evo-ego: the evolution of reproductive interactions (e.g. vertical transmission of symbionts, 592 
or transition from replicators on a surface to replicators in compartments) that modify evolutionary individuality 593 
by changing mechanisms of inheritance. These feedbacks are difficult to accommodate in evolutionary theory 594 
but well-studied in learning systems. We note that each of these feedbacks results in correlations or co-variance 595 
between components that were previously independent: a) The evolution of phenotypic correlations mean that 596 
traits do not vary independently, b) the evolution of ecological dependencies mean that selection pressures on 597 
one species are not independent of the selective pressures on another, and c) the evolution of new reproductive 598 
mechanisms mean that evolutionary units are not inherited independently. But, in evo-devo, correlations evolve 599 
within a single evolutionary unit; in evo-eco, correlations evolve between multiple evolutionary units, and; in 600 
evo-ego, correlations change the evolutionary unit (such that multiple, previously separate units, become a new 601 
single unit at a higher level of organisation) [37]. Learning theory has models that correspond to each of these 602 
cases.   603 
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DISPLAY BOXES 604 
 605 
 606 
 
 
i) univariate models, too 
simple (under-fitting) 
ii) linear correlation model, 
poor fit (under-fitting) 
iii) non-linear correlation 
model (good fit) 
iv) multivariate model, 
too complex (over-fitting) 
 
Many learning methods operate by incrementally adjusting the parameters of a model to improve the fit 
with a set of example data (training set) [14,31,26]. Consider a sample of points, e.g. phenotypes, 
characterised by two features or traits, some of which belong to a particular class (‘+’), e.g. high-fitness 
phenotypes. Learning which feature values are fit on average implicitly represents the class by a region in 
this two-dimensional space (i). This enables a limited sense of generalisation, e.g. novel combinations of fit 
features generate new points in the same region (e.g. new combinations of fit alleles). However, such a 
model might be unable to represent the class accurately (under-fitting), as depicted (e.g. the large region 
includes many unfit points, and the small region excludes approximately half the fit points). The quality of 
generalisation can be improved by representing the class in a parameter space or model space (~genotype 
space) that is different from the feature space (~phenotype space). A basic spectrum of model types is 
depicted. i) Representing a class by an average value for each individual dimension or trait is a univariate 
model. ii-iii) A bivariate or associative model can represent pairwise positive or negative correlations 
among features. Evolutionarily, this can be captured a developmental mapping between genotypes and 
phenotypes that introduces phenotypic correlations. ii) A linear correlation model (like a linear genotype-
phenotype mapping [33]), e.g., representing that trait 1 works well only when trait 2 has a similar value, 
can improve the fit to some extent. iii) However, a non-linear correlation model is the simplest model 
capable of representing multi-modal distributions [32], e.g., representing that high fitness is conferred only 
when the two traits are both high or both low. The latter is particularly important because a multivariate 
model can be constructed by layering one non-linear model onto the outputs of another (hence deep 
learning [29]). iv) In general, multivariate models can represent any data arbitrarily accurately [31]. 
However, fitting a multivariate model by incremental improvement (learning or evolution) can be 
troublesome if it is unnecessarily complex. One fundamental problem is over-fitting, where fitting the 
idiosyncrasies of the training data results in a model that fails to generalise well, excluding some potentially 
desirable points (triangle). 
By separating model space from feature space, learned models can be used to generate or identify novel 
examples with similar structural regularities, or (particularly relevant to evolution) to improve problem-
solving or optimisation ability by changing the representation of solutions or reducing the dimensionality 
of a problem [34,35,36]. 
 
 607 
BOX 1: Learning (and evolution) as model fitting  608 
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i)  The Delta rule is a supervised learning rule that modifies model parameters so as to improve the output 
(or reduce the error between the current output and the ‘desired’ output);  
   Δwij = rdixj  
 where Δwij is the change in the interaction coefficient between input j and output i, xj is the value of the 
input j, r is a learning rate, and di is the desired change in the output (given by the error between the 
desired and actual outputs). Intuitively, given heritable variation in correlations, natural selection for a 
target phenotype will evolve correlations in the same direction as the Delta rule, i.e. to improve the 
output [32].  
ii) Hebb’s rule, often paraphrased as “neurons that fire together wire together”, is an unsupervised learning 
rule (operating without an external ‘teacher’ to define desired outputs) that modifies model parameters 
in the direction that amplifies the current output;  
   Δwij = rxixj  
 where xi is the sign of the current output of unit i.  
 Whereas supervised correlation learning reinforces correlations that are good, unsupervised correlation 
learning merely reinforces correlations that are frequent. Nonetheless, this is sufficient for interesting 
system-level behaviours, such as forming an associative memory of past states [6] building low-
dimensional models of high-dimensional data, and in some cases, improving system-level optimisation 
despite the absence of a global reward function [34,35]. When the current output has the same sign as 
the desired or locally optimal output (i.e. xi=di), Hebb’s rule and the Delta rule change interactions in the 
same direction and hence produce the same dynamical consequences for the behaviour of the system 
[32]. In other cases, when the current output is not optimal, unsupervised learning reinforces the current 
output regardless of its value. Selection for robustness, for example, might be analogous to unsupervised 
learning.  
iii) An interesting parallel exists between unsupervised learning and evolutionary selection on individuals 
within a collective. Specifically, when individual-level selection causes individuals to adopt behaviours 
that do not maximise collective fitness (as per any social dilemma), the effect of individual selection is 
not equivalent to supervised learning for the collective (i.e. xi≠di). Yet, if each individual has adopted a 
state that is locally fit for them, then individual selection on interactions will act to stabilise that state 
[35] (like selection for robustness at the collective level). This reinforces the current system configuration 
(without regard to its effect on collective welfare) as per the action of unsupervised correlation learning 
[35]. Accordingly, even when the collective is not a unit of selection, such as an ecological community, 
unsupervised learning behaviours can be produced at the system level [38].  
BOX 2: supervised and unsupervised correlation learning and the level of selection 610 
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1. Is evolvability evolvable? 
Evolutionary problem: Developmental organisations change over evolutionary time in response to the 
short-term fitness benefits such as from phenotypic robustness. But: How could the evolution of 
developmental organisations favour variability that facilitates long-term evolvability?  
Learning theory insight: Learning theory describes conditions where incremental reward-based 
adaptation can result in successful generalisation to previously unseen situations.  
Example prediction: Short-term selection can increase long-term evolvability if it benefits from an 
appropriate inductive bias, e.g. that the genotype-phenotype map is complex enough to represent 
structure (epistatic interactions) in the selective environment but simple enough to avoid overfitting 
that structure [57,55]. 
2. Can ecosystem functions be adapted without ecosystem selection? 
Evolutionary problem:  The organisation of ecological relationships in an ecosystem changes over 
evolutionary time due to individual selection within each component species. But: Given that an 
ecological community is not a Darwinian unit, how can ecological organisations be anything other than 
the arbitrary consequence of happenstance contingencies? 
Learning theory insight: Unsupervised learning can be produced by very simple component-level 
reinforcement mechanisms (e.g. ‘neurons that fire together wire together’) without a system-level 
reward function but can nonetheless result in non-trivial system-level behaviours (e.g. associative 
memory).  
Example prediction: Individual selection within an ecological community can result in coordinated 
behaviours for the ecosystem as a whole if ‘species that fire together wire together’ (e.g. species that 
are frequently in high density under the same environmental conditions reduce resource competition 
or increase mutualism) [38]. 
3. Is individuality evolvable? 
Evolutionary problem: Reproductive mechanisms defining the level of Darwinian individuality change 
from one level of organisation to another over evolutionary time. But: How can selection at one level of 
biological organisation favour reproductive organisations that support individuality at a higher level 
before that new level of organisation exists? 
Learning theory insight: Deep learning aims to construct hierarchical or multi-scale models. This can be 
achieved in a bottom-up layer-wise manner by using unsupervised learning at one level to reduce the 
dimensionality of the problem space and thus construct representations that are useful for the next 
level up, even before that next level exists.  
Example prediction: Individual selection on reproductive mechanisms can create new evolutionary 
units that are adaptive at a higher level of biological organisation (even before that level of organisation 
exists) if the implicit adaptive problem posed by the environment is ‘hierarchically decomposable’ in a 
recursive fashion [37,36].  
BOX 3. Outstanding Questions in 1) evo-devo, 2) evo-eco and 3) evo-ego research – and potential 
impact of taking a learning theory approach (see Future Prospects a, b and c, respectively).  
 
 
Trends Box 
 
• A simple analogy between learning and evolution is common and intuitive. But recently, 
work demonstrating a deeper unification has been expanding rapidly. 
• Formal equivalences have been shown between learning and evolution in several different 
scenarios, including: Selection in asexual and sexual populations with Bayesian learning, the 
evolution of genotype-phenotype maps with correlation learning, evolving gene-regulation 
networks with neural network learning, and the evolution of ecological relationships with 
distributed memory models.  
• This unification suggests that evolution can learn in more sophisticated ways than previously 
realised and offers new theoretical approaches to tackling evolutionary puzzles such as the 
evolution of evolvability, the evolution of ecological organisations and the evolution of 
Darwinian individuality. 
 
 
